Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-p566r Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-29T04:24:24.033Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Understanding and explaining real self-deception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Alfred R. Mele
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Davidson College, Davidson, NC 28036 almele@davidson.edu

Abstract

This response addresses seven main issues: (1) alleged evidence that in some instances of self-deception an individual simultaneously possesses “contradictory beliefs”; (2) whether garden-variety self-deception is intentional; (3) whether conditions that I claimed to be conceptually sufficient for self-deception are so; (4) significant similarities and differences between self-deception and interpersonal deception; (5) how instances of self-deception are to be explained, and the roles of motivation in explaining them; (6) differences among various kinds of self- deception; (7) whether a proper conception of self-deception implies that definitive ascriptions of self-deception to individuals are impossible.

Type
Author's Response
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)