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Reuse (neural, bodily, and environmental) as a fundamental organizational principle of human cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Lucia Foglia  and
Rick Grush
Lucia Foglia
Affiliation:
Dipartimento di Studi Storico, Sociali e Filosofici, Università degli Studi di Siena, 52100 Arezzo, Italy. foglialucia@libero.it
Rick Grush
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of California – San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0119. rick@mind.ucsd.eduhttp://mind.ucsd.edu
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Abstract

We taxonomize the varieties of representational reuse and point out that all the sorts of reuse that the brain engages in (1) involve something like a model (or schema or simulator), and (2) are effected in bodily and external media, as well as neural media. This suggests that the real fundamental organizational principle is not neural reuse, but model reuse.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 274
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

Foglia, L. & Grush, R. (in preparation) The limitations of a purely enactive (nonrepresentational) account of imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies.Google Scholar
Grush, R. (2004) The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27:377–442.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed