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Effective untestability and bounded rationality help in seeing religion as adaptive misbelief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2010

Konrad Talmont-Kaminski
Konrad Talmont-Kaminski
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy. Marie Curie-Sklodowska University, 20-031 Lublin, Poland. ktalmont@bacon.umcs.lublin.plhttp://bacon.umcs.lublin.pl/~ktalmont
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Abstract

McKay & Dennett (M&D) look for adaptive misbeliefs that result from the normal, though fallible, functioning of human cognition. Their account can be substantially improved by the addition of two elements: (1) significance of a belief's testability for its functionality, and (2) an account of reason appropriate to understanding systemic misbelief. Together, these points show why religion probably is an adaptive misbelief.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 6 , December 2009 , pp. 536 - 537
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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