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What if phenomenal consciousness admits of degrees?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Robert Van Gulick
Robert Van Gulick
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy 541 HL, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244. rnvangul@syr.edu
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Abstract

If the phenomenality of consciousness admits of degrees and can be partial and indeterminate, then Block's inference to the best explanation may need to be revaluated both in terms of the supposed data on phenomenal overflow and the range of alternatives against which his view is compared.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 528 - 529
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

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