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Inferences are just folk psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 March 2005

Thomas Metzinger*
Affiliation:
Philosophisches Seminar, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, D-55099Mainz, Germanyhttp://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/metzinger/

Abstract:

To speak of “inferences,” “interpretations,” and so forth is just folk psychology. It creates new homunculi, and it is also implausible from a purely phenomenological perspective. Phenomenal volition must be described in the conceptual framework of an empirically plausible theory of mental representation. It is a non sequitur to conclude from dissociability that the functional properties determining phenomenal volition never make a causal contribution.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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