Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-995ml Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-27T14:39:20.944Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Response to Lachman

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2004

Tim van Gelder*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC3010, Australia

Abstract

Lachman claims that the Dynamical Hypothesis (DH) is “untenable.” His own position is a version of the “The DH is epistemological, not ontological,” objection to the target article, which is dealt with in section R2.3 of my original response (van Gelder 1998r). Additional objections are that the coverage of the hypothesis is “vast” and that the DH presupposes we have reached the end point of scientific theorizing. Indeed, the DH is very broad, but it does not presuppose that science has ended; that's why we call it a “hypothesis.”

Type
Author's Response
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Munitz, M. K. (1986) Cosmic understanding: Philosophy and science of the universe. Princeton University Press. [RL]Google Scholar
Newell, A. (1992) Précis of Unified theories of cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15(3):425-92. [RL]Google Scholar
Simon, H. A. (1981) The sciences of the artificial, 3rd edition. MIT Press. [RL]Google Scholar
van Gelder, T. (1998t) The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21(5):615-28. [RL]Google Scholar
(1998r) Disentangling dynamics, computation, and cognition. (Author’s Response to Commentators.) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21(5):654-65. [rTvG]Google Scholar
Whittaker, E. T. (1942) The beginning and end of the world. Oxford University Press. [RL]Google Scholar