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Is category specificity in the world or in the mind?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2001

H. Clark Barrett
Affiliation:
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, 14195 Berlin, Germanybarrett@mpib-berlin.mpg.de

Abstract

HIT produces category-specific deficits without category- specific mechanisms by assuming that differences in properties of objects are transparently converted into differences in representational format. A complete model would specify the mechanisms that accomplish this. Such category-specific mechanisms may have evolved because assumptions about the properties of some kinds of objects (e.g., living things) are invalid for others (e.g., artifacts).

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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