¹ Nettl, , “The State as a Conceptual Variable”, World Politics 20 (July 1968), 559.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Nettl was interdisciplinary—s footnotes refer to a wide range of sociologists, political scientists, 1 and historians—but in 1968 he found references to economists or economic logic unnecessary in dealing with debates on the state.

³ Nettl (fn. 1) saw the international arena almost purely in realist terms, arguing that in the international arena the state was “the almost exclusive and acceptable locus of resource mobilization” (p. 563). In Nerd's view, “Here [in the international system] the state is the basic, irreducible unit, equivalent to the individual person in a society” (p. 563). Since the “international function is invariant”, “even where the notion of the state is very weak, as in Britain and the United States, the effective extrasocietal or international role is not affected” (p. 564).

⁴ Nettl (fh.l), 562,561.

⁵ Ibid., 561.

⁶ Daedalus 24 (Spring 1995).Google Scholar

⁷ Strange, Susan, “The Defective State”, Daedalus 124 (Spring 1995), 56.Google Scholar

⁸ Nettl (fn.l), 591.

⁹ Waltz, Cf. Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Nettl's formulation is quoted in fn. 3.

¹¹ Wade, Robert, “Globalization and Its Limits: Reports of the Death of the National Economy Are Greatly Exaggerated”, in Berger, Suzanne and Dore, Ronald, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996)Google Scholar. Wade offers a compilation of other such statistics, along with a nicely skeptical and carefully balanced account of the ways in which such statistics may exaggerate globalization.

¹² See Reich, Robert B., The Work of Nations (New York: Vintage Books, 1992)Google Scholar; Gereffi, Gary and Korzeniewicz, Miguel, eds., Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994)Google Scholar. For a comprehensive vision of the consequences of global networks for social organization, see Castells, Manuel, The: Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, vol. 1, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwells, 1996).Google Scholar

¹³ Reich (fn. 12).

¹⁴ See Block, Fred, The Vampire State and Other Stories (New York; New Press, 1996).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Cable, , “The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power”, Daedalus 124 (Spring 1995), 27.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Block (fn. 14). See also Garrett, Geoffrey, “Capital Mobility, Trade and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy”, International Organization 49, no. 4 (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Garrett emphasizes the surprising extent to which European social democracies have been able to resist “the dictatorship of international financial markets”, but he leaves no doubt that resistance imposes a growing price. For example, he concludes his study by saying: “[F]inancial markets have imposed significant interest rate premiums on the power of the left and organized labor, and these increased with the removal of barriers to crossborder capital flows.… In time, one might speculate that no government would be able to bear this burden” (p. 683).

¹⁷ Cameron, , “The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis”, American Political Science Review 72, no. 4 (1978).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ See Katzenstein, , Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).Google Scholar

¹⁹ See Bairoch, Paul and Kozul-Wright, Richard, “Globalisation: Myths and Realities: Some Historical Reflections on Integration, Industrialisation and Growth in the World Economy” (Paper presented at the UNU/WIDER conference on “Transnational Corporations in the Developed, Developing and Transitional Economies: Changing Strategies and Policy Implications”, Cambridge University, September 21–23,1995).Google Scholar

²⁰ Geoffrey Garrett's analysis (see fn. 16) of data from fifteen OECD countries over the period 1967–90, which included other measures of globalization, helps to further elucidate institutional connections between globalization and the expansion of government. He found that a “coincidence of strong leftist parties, capital mobility, strong trade unions, and high levels of trade led to greater government spending.” For another analysis of the ways in which the consequences of globalization are mediated by national institutions, see Herbert Kitschelt et al., eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

²¹ Rodrik, “The Paradoxes of the Successful State” (Alfred Marshall Lecture, delivered during the European Economic Association meetings, Istanbul, August 22–24 [final version, September], 1996a), 31–32. See also idem, “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments” (NBER Working Paper no. 5537, April 1996b).Google Scholar

²² Rodrik(fn.21,1996a),32.

²³ For a sampling of the now voluminous literature on the role of the state in the East Asian economic miracle, see Akyuz, Yilmaz and Gore, Charles, “The Investment-Profits Nexus in East Asian Industrialization” (Background paper prepared for the conference on “East Asian Development: Lessons for a New Global Environment”, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, February 29 and March 1,1996).Google Scholar See also the published version, World Development 24, no. 3 (1996)Google Scholar; Amsden, Alice, Asia's Next Giant: Smith Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Campos, José Edgardo and Root, Hilton L., The Key to the Asian Miracle: Making Shared Growth Credible (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996)Google Scholar; Cheng, Tun-jen, “The Politics of Industrial Transformation: The Case of the East Asia NICs” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1987)Google Scholar; Evans, Peter, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995)Google Scholar; Haggard, Stephan, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Grwath if Industrial Policy, 1925–1975 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Wade, Robert, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in Taiwan's Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; World Bank (IBRD), The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth aid Public Policy (A World Bank Policy Research Report) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).Google Scholar

²⁴ On Singapore's internationalized strategy of development and the role of the state bureaucracy in this strategy, see Campos and Root (fn. 23); Cheng (fn. 23); Koh, Gillian, “A Sociological Analysis of the Singapore Administrative Elite: The Bureaucracy in an Evolving Developmentalist State” (Ph.D. diss., University of Sheffield, England, 1995)Google Scholar; Quah, Jonathan, “The Public Bureaucracy and National Development in Singapore”, in Tummala, K. K., ed., Administrative Systems Abroad (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982)Google Scholar; idem, “The Rediscovery of the Market and Public Administration: Some Lessons from the Singapore Experience”, Australian Journal of Public Administration 51, no. 3 (1993)Google Scholar; Root, Hilton L., Small Countries, Big Lessons: Governance and the Rise of East Asia (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996)Google Scholar.

²⁵ See Peter Evans, “TNCs and Third World States: From the Old Internationalization to the New”, in Richard Kozul-Wright and Robert Rowthorne, eds., Transnational Corporations and the Global Economy (London: MacMillan, forthcoming).

²⁶ Ruggie, , “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order”, International Organization 36 (Spring 1982).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁷ For a general discussion of changes in regulatory fashion since the golden age, see Chang, Ha-Joon, “The Evolution of Perspectives on Regulation in the Postwar Era”, Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1995)Google Scholar. For a discussion of the way in which the WTO constrains economically nationalist strategies such as industrial policy, see Panchamuki, V. R., “WTO and Industrial Policies”, Study no. 7, UNCTAD Project on East Asian Development: Lessons for a New Global Environment (Geneva: United Nations, 1996)Google Scholar.

²⁸ See, for example, Evans, Peter, “Declining Hegemony and Assertive Industrialization: U.S.Brazilian Conflict in the Computer Industry”, International Organization 43 (Spring 1989).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁹ Cf. Garrett (fa. 16); Kitschelt et al. (fn. 20).

³⁰ For a general discussion of the extent to which firms rely on states to create and sustain markets, see Fligstein, Neil, “Markets, Politics and Globalization” (Manuscript, Berkeley, 1996)Google Scholar. See also idem, “Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions” American Sociological Review 6 (August 1996).Google Scholar

³¹ See Block (fn. 14).

³² In the Third World there is, of course, a long-standing tradition of seeing the state in these terms, that is, as a “tool of imperialism.'' In the United States a lively folk tradition is rapidly developing along analogous lines. As nonsensical as fears of “black helicopters” and visions of the U.S. government as a pawn of the UN may be, this folk mythology does reflect an underlying sense that U.S. administrations are more responsive to transnational actors than to domestic pressure from below.

³³ For a review of early efforts in this direction, see Evans, Peter, Reuschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Thedi, eds., Bringing tie State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially the initial essay by Skocpol.

³⁴ See discussion in Evans (fn. 23), chap. 2.

³⁵ Cf. Weiss, Linda and Hobson, John M.. States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Analysis (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1995)Google Scholar.

³⁶ See Buchanan, James M., Tollison, Robert D., and Tullock, Gordon, eds., Toward a Theory of Rent-Seeking Society (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1980)Google Scholar; Collander, David, ed., Neoclassical Political Economy: An Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984)Google Scholar; Krueger, Anne O., “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review 64 (June 1974)Google Scholar.

³⁷ Speech by Senator Kyl in the Senate, January 20,1995, quoted in Fred Block (fn. 14).

³⁸ For a sophisticated but nontechnical exposition, see Romer, Paul “The Origins of Endogenous Growth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 8 (Winter 1994)Google Scholar.

³⁹ For example, in the view of Garrett (fn. 16), “‘New Growth’ theory contends that active government involvement in the economy (for example, public spending on education, physical infrastructure, and research and development) may actually increase productivity and hence competitiveness by providing collective goods that are undersupplied by the market” (p. 658). Others, like Paul Krugman, would argue that government efforts to exploit the theoretical possibilities revealed by the new growth theory are likely to do more harm than good; see, for example, Krugman, , Peddling Prosperity: Economic Seme and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995)Google Scholar. Nonetheless, even Krugman would not deny that new theoretical possibilities have been opened up.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Arthur, Brian W., “Positive Feedbacks in the Economy,” Scientific American (February 1990)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ See, for example, North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; and Williamson, Oliver, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

⁴² For a sampling of the variety of ways which civil society has captured the imagination of social scientists, see Diamond, Larry, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 5 (July 1994)Google Scholar; Gellner, Ernest, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (New York: Penguin Press, 1994)Google Scholar; Hall, John A., ed., Civil Society: Theory, History and Comparisons (London: Polity Press, 1995)Google Scholar; Wapner, Paul, “Politics beyond the State: Environment Activism and World Civic Politics,” World Politics 47 (April 1995).Google Scholar

⁴³ Coleman, James, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990), 321.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Civil society was, of course, the most universalistic basis for organizing communities. Exclusionary ethnic and religious categories represented potent alternative bases for redefining the nation and reconstituting the footing of public authority. While Nettl did not anticipate the upsurge of neoclassical political economy, he did see (fn. 1) the “snapping of the link between state and nation” (p. 560) as a reason for projecting a general decline in stateness, especially in the developing world.

⁴⁵ Migdal, , Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 269 Google Scholar.

³⁴ Putnam, , Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 176.Google Scholar In part, the differences between Putnam and Migdal result from their different definitions of a strong society. Migdal focuses on vertical, clientelistic ties and parochial relationships based on primordial affinities like ethnicity and kinship. Putnam focuses on civic associations that foster ties among social equals and that, while they may be deeply rooted in history, are modern rather than primordial in form. Putnam's version of society is, however, the one that is relevant to the vision that the emergence of civil society will permit the withering away of formal leviathans of repressive public authority. What optimistic proponents of civil society have in mind when they work toward fostering its rebirth in Eastern Europe or its reinvigoration in Latin America is presumably neither the strengthening of clientelistic ties nor the reawakening of primordial loyalties and parochial prejudices but rather the kinds of horizontal civic associations that are the focus of Putnam's argument. I am indebted to Patrick Heller for drawing this point to my attention; cf. Heller, “Social Mobilization and Democratization: Comparative Lessons from Kerala” (Paper presented at the annual meetings of the Association for Asian Studies, April 1996).

⁴⁷ Chazan, , “Engaging the State: Associational Life in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Migdal, Joel, Kohli, Atul, and Shue, Vivienne, eds., State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 258.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Ibid., 269

⁴⁹ Ibid., 278

⁵⁰ See Shue, “State Power and Social Organization in China” in Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (fn. 47), 66.

⁵¹ O'Donnell, , “On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries,” World Development 21, no. 8 (1993)Google Scholar. O'Donnell uses the term “browning” to refer to “territorial evaporation of the public dimension of the state” (p. 1358), that is, the spread of areas in which both effective bureaucracies and “properly sanctioned legality” (p. 1359) are lacking.

⁵² O'Donnell (fn. 51), 1358.

⁵³ Ibid., 1365.

⁵⁴ See the article by Lam (fn. 54). See also Moore, Michael P., “The Fruits and Fallacies of Neoliberalism: The Case of Irrigation,” World Development 17, no. 11 (1989).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See Ostrom's (fn. 54) discussion of Nigeria.

⁵⁷ Skocpol, Theda, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 480–91Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 486. See also Skocpol, Theda and Finegold, Kenneth, “State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal,” Political Science Quarterly 97 (Summer 1982)Google Scholar. For a recent reprise of Skocpol's perspective, see Skocpol, , “Unravelling from Above,” American Prospect 25 (March-April 1996)Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ O'Donnell(fn.51).

⁶⁰ Rodrik (fh. 21,1996a), 2–3.

⁶¹ “Nettl (fn.l), 561.

⁶² See, for example, Wade, Robert, “Japan, the World Bank and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance”, New Left Review 217 (May-June 1996).Google Scholar

⁶³ Some would argue that the East Asian experience already constitutes a competing model, at least for the developing countries of the region itself. See Stallings, Barbara and Streeck, Wolfgang, “Capitalisms in Conflict? The United States, Europe and Japan in the Post-Cold War World”, in Stallings, , ed., Global Challenge, Regional Response: The New International Context of Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Strange (fn. 7), 71.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Another potential source of normative change—also unlikely but still intriguing—is to be found in the networks of public organizations and officials that are part of the global order. John Meyer, in a classik article, presents a strong case for the collective power of public officials to shape global norms at the transnational level; see Meyer, , “The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State”, in Bergesen, Albert, ed., Studies in the Modern World System (New York: Academic Press, 1980)Google Scholar. Meyer's general model is unconvincing, especially in view of more recent changes in global ideology, but there are some very interesting, if modest, examples of transnational networks rooted in public institutions that have effected change in the global normative order. See, for example, Haas, Peter, “Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone”, International Organization 46 (Winter 1992).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁷ See Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (fn. 47), especially Kohli and Shue, “State Power and the Social Forces: On Political Contention and Accommodation in the Third World”.