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Between Autonomy and State Regulation: J.S. Mill's Elastic Paternalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 October 2012

Raphael Cohen-Almagor
Raphael Cohen-Almagor*
Affiliation:
University of Hull
*
R.Cohen-Almagor@hull.ac.uk
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Abstract

This paper analyses J.S. Mill's theory on the relationships between individual autonomy and State powers. It will be argued that there is a significant discrepancy between Mill's general liberal statements aimed to secure individual largest possible autonomy and the specific examples which provide the government with quite wide latitude for interference in the public and private spheres. The paper outlines the boundaries of government interference in the Millian theory. Subsequently it describes Mill's elastic paternalism designed to prevent people from inflicting harm upon others as well as upon themselves, from soft paternalism on issues like compulsory education to hard paternalism on very private matters such as marriage, having children, and divorce by consent.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 87 , Issue 4 , October 2012 , pp. 557 - 582
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2012

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