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People Themselves, and/or Their Selves?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Antony Flew
Antony Flew
Affiliation:
University of Reading
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 68 , Issue 266 , October 1993 , pp. 546 - 548
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1993

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References

1 Philosophy 68, No. 263 (01 1993), 15–33.Google Scholar

2 Ibid., 15.

3 Ibid., 15.

4 Ibid., 15.

5 Ibid., 15.

6 For many more examples and some commentary compare Jones, J. R. ‘The Self in Sensory Cognition’Google Scholar and my ‘Selves’ in Mind for respectively, January and July 1949.

7 For discussion of these issues see ‘The Presuppositions of Survival’ in Philosophy 62, No. 239, (01 1987), 17–30Google Scholar; and compare Flew, AntonyThe Logic of Mortality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), passim.Google Scholar

8 Philosophy 68, No. 263 (01 1993), 15.Google Scholar

9 See for instance, Casimir Lewy's characteristically fastidious and persistent paper, ‘Is the Notion of Disembodied Existence Self-Contradictory?’ in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for 1942–1943, 59–70.Google Scholar