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The Development of Regionalism in Southeast Asia1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

William Henderson
William Henderson
Affiliation:
Research Associate and Director of Meetings at the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., New York.
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Extract

One of the major premises of United States policy in Southeast Asia, as it has evolved during the past few years, appears to be that effective regional organization is a practical political possibility. To an increasing extent we have sought to implement policy objectives in the area through the development of regional institutions. Thus the United States took the lead in the negotiation of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (the Manila Pact), which is a mutual security arrangement for the defense of Southeast Asia against aggression by means of armed attack or subversion. In the economic field we joined, after an initial period of hesitation, in the British Commonwealth-sponsored Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia. While American economic assistance to Asian countries has always been, and still is, extended primarily on a bilateral basis, the government let it be known early in 1955 that it would be prepared to establish a special regional fund of about $200 million to be used for projects benefiting more than one country, if the nations concerned could themselves devise a satisfactory program. The fact that the Simla Conference, called soon thereafter by India to discuss the American proposal, failed to reach agreement on regional use of the fund does not negate the general impression of American concern for a regional approach.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 9 , Issue 4 , November 1955 , pp. 463 - 476
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1955

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References

2 The term Southeast Asia is commonly applied to that part of Asia which lies east of India and south of China. It includes Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia (and the disputed territory of West New Guinea), the Philippines, the component parts of former French Indochina (North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), and also the British dependencies of North Borneo, the crown colony of Singapore and Portuguese Timor.

3 Peffer, Nathaniel, “Regional Security in Southeast Asia,” International Organisation, VIII, p. 311–315Google Scholar. See also Wint, Guy, “South Asia: Unity and Disunity,” International Conciliation, 11 1954 (No. 500), p.129–191Google Scholar.

4 The present writer has himself subscribed to this point of view, unfortunately without sufficient qualification, in a recent publication. See Henderson, William, “New Nations of Southeast Asia.” Headline Series, 03–04 1955 (No. 110) p. 54–55Google Scholar.

5 Padelford, Norman J., “Regional Organization and the United Nations,” International Organization, VIII, p. 203–216Google Scholar.

6 Southeast Asia was represented by delegations from Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand, and two from Indochina: one from the communist dominated Republic of Vietnam and the other a pro-French delegation representing Cochinchina, Laos and Cambodia.

7 Quoted in Levi, Werner, Free India in Asia, Minneapolis, 1952, p. 38Google Scholar.

8 Southeast Asia was represented by delegations from Burma and the Philippines only. Thailand sent an observer.

9 Quoted in Meyer, Milton W., “Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” Columbia Journal of International Affairs, Spring 1949 (Vol. III, No. 2 ), p. 74Google Scholar.

10 New York Times, December 30, 1954.

11 Including delegations from Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand, North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

12 Communist China purported to take positive steps toward the settlement of several outstanding issues at the Bandung Conference when it offered to negotiate with the United States on the Formosa question, reached an agreement with Indonesia on the status of Chinese domiciled in that country, and gave assurances to several of its neighbors against the threat of aggression. The long run implications of these apparently conciliatory gestures cannot yet be evaluated. For the text of the final communique of the Conference, see New York times, April 26, 1955.

13 Poplai, S. L., “The Colombo Conference of South-East Asian Prime Ministers,” Foreign Affairs Reports, 07 1954 (Vol. III, No. 7), p. 84Google Scholar.

14 Olver, A. S. B., “The Special Commission in South-East Asia,” Pacific Affairs, 09 1948 (Vol. XXI, No. 3), p. 287Google Scholar.

15 Schaaf, C. Hart, “The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East,” International Organization, VII, p. 471Google Scholar.

16 Ibid., p. 471–473.

17 That is, each member country in South and Southeast Asia. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States are also members, but they are contributors rather than recipients of development assistance. In all likelihood the role of Japan, which was recently admitted to membership, will also be that of a contributor.

18 For an extended discussion of the Colombo Plan, see Basch, Antonin, “The Colombo Plan: A Case of Regional Economic Corporation, ” International Organization IX, p. 1–18Google Scholar.

19 New York Times, May 14, 1955.

20 It is worth recalling that at the present time India obtains from the United States less economic assistance per capita than any other recipient Asian country. Its vast population and greater needs would give it a strong claim to receive, at the expense of the other participants, a proportionately larger share of any regionally administered aid program.

21 New York Times, May 13, 1955.

22 Ibid., July 12, 1949.

23 See, for example, Secretary of State Dean Acheson's statement concerning proposals for a Pacific Pact, in Ibid., May 19, 1949.

24 See the report of a speech delivered by Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk at Philadelphia, in Ibid., February 10, 1951.

25 For the text of the treaty and the additional protocol, see Ibid., September 9, 1954.