¹ Speech by General Wu Hsiu-chuan, special representative of Communist China, at the Security Council on November 28, 1950 (UN Document S/1921). See also his proposed speech to the Assembly's First (Political and Security) Committee which was circulated by Soviet representative Andrei Vyshinsky on February 6, 1951 (UN Document A/C.1/661). These speeches and other statements made by the Communist Chinese delegation in New York and London are also printed in a pamphlet, , China Accusesl, published by Peking's Foreign Languages Press in 1951Google Scholar.

² The People's Republic of China (also referred to as the PRC) is the official name of Communist China. Unless otherwise noted, the terms “China” and “Chinese” as used in this article refer to Communist China and should not be confused with Nationalist China (the Republic of China).

³ See Edwards, R. Randle, “The Attitude of the People's Republic of China toward International Law and the United Nations,” Papers on China (from seminars at Harvard University), 12 1963 (Vol. 17), pp. 235–271Google Scholar.

⁴ A solid legal analysis of the question of representation is Singh, Negendra, Termination of Membership of International Organization (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1958)Google Scholar, Chapter 9. See also Higgins, Rosalyn, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations (London: Oxford University Press)Google Scholar, Part III.

⁵ Indeed, the Communist Chinese concern over the UN predates October 1949. This article starts with the date of the establishment of Communist China for reasons of expediency.

⁶ Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, September 29, 1949, Chapter 7 (summarized in Boyd, R. G., Communist China's Foreign Policy [New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962], p. 2)Google Scholar.

⁷ Steiner, H. Arthur, The International Position of Communist China: Political and Ideological Directions of Foreign Policy (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), p. 2Google Scholar.

⁸ See Halpern, A. M., “Communist China's Demands on the World,” in Kaplan, Morton A. (ed.), The Revolution in World Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), p. 238Google Scholar.

⁹ One of the five appointed by Chiang Kai-shek to represent China at the San Francisco United Nations Conference on International Organization in 1945 was Tung Pi-wu, a Communist Party member, now Vice Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. See Boorman, Howard L., “Tung Pi-wu: A Political Profile,” China Quarterly (London), 07–09 1964 (No.19) PP. 75 ffGoogle Scholar; and Tse-tung, Mao, Selected Worlds, Vol. 3 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), pp. 306–307Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Haas, Ernst B., “Types of Collective Security: An Examination of Operational Concepts,” American Political Science Review,03 1955 (Vol. 49, No. 1), pp. 40–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ Memorandum on Legal Aspects of the Problem of Representation in the United Nations, transmitted to the President of the Security Council by the Secretary-General, March 8, 1950 (UN Document S/1466).

¹² Security Council Official Records(5th year), 460th meeting, January 12, 1950, p. 6.

¹³ On January 5, 1950, President Harry S. Truman announced:

The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. See The New York. Times, January 6, 1950, pp. 1, 3, and 4.

¹⁴ Some observers contend that Peking's seizure of United States compounds in the Chinese capital and its recognition of Ho Chi-minh's regime in Indochina were “calculated steps” taken by the Chinese to make it impossible for the Security Council to seat Communist China in place of Nationalist China. The former led to the recall of United States official personnel from China, and the latter prevented the French from recognizing China and voting for seating it in the Security Council. It seems to this writer, however, that the reverse is closer to the truth. The fact that both actions (initiated on January 14 and 19, respectively) were taken after the Security Council rejected the Soviet draft resolution to discredit Dr. Tsiang T'ing-fu of Nationalist China on January 13 seems to suggest that they were acts of retaliation. See The New York Times, January 15, 1950, pp. 1, 4; Lie, Trygve, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years With the United Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 266Google Scholar; and Tsou, Tang, America's Failure in China, 1941–1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 518, 523–527Google Scholar. In this connection an interesting hypothesis is that the leaders of the Soviet Union were the ones who had cleverly maneuvered to keep Communist China out of the UN. This could have been one of the underlying reasons behind the Sino-Soviet conflict. See The New York, Times, November 21, 1950, p. 1; Lie, pp. 258, 267—270, 272–273; Paloczi-Horvath, George, Mao Tse-tung, Emperor of Blue Ants (New York: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 255–259Google Scholar; Snow, Edgar, The Other Side of the River: Red China Today (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 98Google Scholar; and Byron S. Weng, “Russia, Communist China, and the UN,” to appear in early 1967 in the first issue of VIDYA-Journal of RCIE(Pittsburgh).

¹⁵ References to the communications between the UN and Communist China in this article are based on the author's own compilation. The main sources are: 1) United Nations Documents Index, 01 1950—(Vol. 1, No. 1—)Google Scholar (UN Document ST/LIB/SER.E/1—); and 2) Gakkai, Asia Seikei (ed.), Chuka finmin Kyowakpku Gaikp Shiryo Soran (Collection of Materials on the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China [in Japanese]) (Tokyo: Ichibashi Shobo, 1960)Google Scholar. It is possible that the present author's compilation is not exhaustive, but the statistical significance seems clear enough for the purpose of this study.

¹⁶ Yearbook, of the United Nations, 1950 (United Nations: Office of Public Information, 1951), p. 968Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Asia Seikei Gakkai (ed.), pp. 149–181.

¹⁸ See below, pp. 683–684, 686–687. There seems to be no communication from Communist China to the UN on record after the third period.

¹⁹ Whiting, Allen S., China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (a RAND Corporation Research Study) (New York: Macmillan, 1960)Google Scholar.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 46, 159.

²¹ See, for instance, the telegram, dated October 17, 1950, from the Foreign Minister of Communist China addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the Secretary-General (UN Document A/C.1/590).

²² See Security Council Official Records (5th year), 501st meeting, September 12, 1950, pp. 14–15; Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1 July 1950–30 June 1951 (General Assembly Official Records [6th session], Supplement No. 1), pp. 75—78.

²³ See Security Council Official Records (5th year), 483rd meeting, August 4, 1950, p. 4; ibid., 496th meeting, September 6, 1950, pp. 20–21; and UN Document S/1703.

²⁴ The New York Times, September 9, 1950, p. 1.

²⁵ Lichterman, Martin, “Korea: Problems in Limited War,” in Turner, Gordon B. and Challener, Richard D. (ed.), National Security in the Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 34Google Scholar.

²⁶ People's China (Peking), 10 16, 1950 (Vol. 2, No. 10), p. 9Google Scholar. See also, Lie, pp. 350 ff.

²⁷ Panikkar, K. M., In Two Chinas (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), pp. 109–110Google Scholar.

²⁸ Whiting, pp. 118, 122.

²⁹ General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), November 3, 1950. See the statement by Soviet delegate Andrei Vyshinsky in General Assembly Official Records (5th session), 301st plenary meeting, November 2, 1950, pp. 324–335.

³⁰ General Assembly Resolution 498 (V), February 1, 1951.

³¹ General Assembly Resolution 500 (V), May 18, 1951.

³² People's China (Peking), 12 1, 1951 (Vol. 4, No. 11), p. 3Google Scholar.

³³ Whiting, pp. 112–114.

³⁴ See, for instance, the cablegram, dated September 10, 1950, addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (UN Document S/1776).

³⁵ See, for instance, Commission of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, “Report on U.S. Crimes in Korea” Supplement to People's China (Peking), 06 1, 1952 (No. 11)Google Scholar.

³⁶ UN Document S/1921; and UN Document A / C. I / 661.

³⁷ The New York Times, December 16, 1950, p. 1; and ibid., December 17, 1950, pp. 1, 12.

³⁸ Supplement to People's China (Peking),11 1, 1952 (No. 21)Google Scholar.

³⁹ See UN Department of Public Information, How the United Nations Met the Challenge of Korea (UN Publication Sales No. 1953. 1. 24) (New York: United Nations, n.d.)Google Scholar; and “Korean Armistice Agreement and Other Documents,” Supplement to People's China (Peking), 08 1, 1953 (No. 15)Google Scholar, for texts of relevant documents.

⁴⁰ Tsou, Tang and Halperin, Morton H., “Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior,” American Political Science Review, 03 1965 (Vol. 59, No. 1), pp. 80–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar. There is a recent reemphasis on this strategy. An early writing by Mao Tse-tung has been reprinted in full in Peking Review, followed by another article by Lin Piao, elaborating on its international significance today. See Tse-tung, Mao, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan,” Peking Review, 08 27, 1965 (Vol. 8, No. 35), pp. 8–22Google Scholar; and Piao, Lin, “Long Live the Victory of People's War,” Peking Review, 09 3, 1965 (Vol. 8, No. 36), pp. 9–30Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Tsou and Halperin, p. 84.

⁴² Halpern, p. 238.

⁴³ See Whitaker, Urban, “China Lobby's New Gambit,” The Nation, 10 7, 1961 (Vol. 193, No. 11), pp. 225–228Google Scholar; and Boyle, F. X., “The Truth About Communist China,” Fact, 11–12 1964 (Vol. 1, Issue 6), pp. 33–41Google Scholar, for helpful clarification on this point.

⁴⁴ The “Five Principles” evolved from discussions between Chou and Jawaharlal Nehru on Tibet in April 1954 and were emphatically repeated in all subsequent dealings between China and other Asian neutrals concerning border disputes. They are: 1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2) nonaggression; 3) noninterference in each other's internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual advantage; and 5) peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation.

⁴⁵ Kahin, George McT., The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 14ffGoogle Scholar. See also, Wright, Richard, The Color Curtain (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Co., 1956), p. 173Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ See Appleton, Sheldon, The Eternal Triangle? (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1961)Google Scholar, Chapter V.

⁴⁷ For instance, in the preamble to the Sino-Afghanistan Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Nonaggression, August 26, 1960, the two parties concluded the treaty “in accordance with the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter.” (Peking Review, 05 13, 1960 [Vol. 3, No. 20], p. 18Google Scholar.)

⁴⁸ Newman, Robert P., Recognition of Communist China? (New York: Macmillan, 1961), p. 109Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ See Lash, Joseph P., Dag Hammarskjöld—Custodian of the Brushfire Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 61–65Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ About this time the UN publicly declared that “Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld has no doubt about the safety of those members of the families wishing to visit China to see their men.” However, a State Department announcement said that the United States government could not “in good conscience encourage those who may wish to go into an area where the normal protections of an American passport cannot be offered.” (ibid., p. 62.)

⁵¹ ibid., p. 63. See also, Miller, Richard I., Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y: Oceana Publications, 1961)Google Scholar, Chapter 2.

⁵² Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily)(Peking) editorial of 11 13, 1956Google Scholar. See also, American Consulate General (Hong Kong), Survey of China Mainland Press, 11 16, 1956 (No. 1412), pp. 22–24Google Scholar.

⁵³ ibid., pp. 22—24.

⁵⁴ People's China (Peking), 10 16, 1955 (No. 20), p. 41Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ American Consulate General (Hong Kong), Survey of China Mainland Press, 10 4, 1957 (No. 1624), p. 58Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Steiner, p. 84.

⁵⁷ Tsow and Halperin, p. 84.

⁵⁸ Halpern, p. 239. In November 1957 Mao told Chinese students in Moscow: “At present, it is not the West wind that was prevailing over the East wind but the East wind prevailing over the West wind.” (Mao Chu-hsi tsai Su-Lien ti Yen-lun [Chairman Mao's Speeches in the Soviet Union] [Peking, 1957], PP. 14–15.)Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Baum, Richard D., “‘Red and Expert’: the Politico-Ideological Foundations of China's Great Leap Forward,” Asian Survey, 09 1964 (Vol. 4, No. 9), pp. 1048–1057CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁰ Tang, Peter, Communist China Today (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), Vol. 1, pp. 502–503Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Thant, U, “A Burmese View of World Tensions,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 07 1958 (Vol. 318), pp. 34–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Urban Whitaker reached a similar conclusion after intensive interviews with 96 UN delegations during 1960. See “Last Chance on China,” The Progressive, 10 1961 (Vol. 25, No. 10), pp. 9–12Google Scholar.

⁶² American Consulate General (Hong Kong), Survey of China Mainland Press, 08 28, 1958 (No. 1842), pp. 39–40Google Scholar.

⁶³ Mezerik, A. G. (ed.), China Representation in the United Nations (New York: International Review Service, 1965), p. 68Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ New China News Agency (Peking), 10 10, 1959Google Scholar. See also, American Consulate General (Hong Kong), Survey of China Mainland Press, 10 15, 1959 (No. 2117), p. 24Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ American Consulate General (Hong Kong), Survey of China Mainland Press, 10 29, 1959 (No. 2126), pp. 33–34Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ lbid., p. 34.

⁶⁷ ibid., p. 41.

⁶⁸ American Consulate General (Hong Kong), Survey of China Mainland Press, 10 25, 1960 (No. 2364), p. 40Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ For a discussion on the effects of the Great Leap Forward see Alsop, Joseph, “On China's Descending Spiral,” China Quarterly (London), 07–09 1962 (No. 11), pp. 21—37Google Scholar; and comments on the article by Eckstein, Alexander and others in China Quarterly (London), 10–12 1962 (No. 12), pp. 19–56Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ See Barnett, A. Doak, Communist China and Asia (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), pp. 306–315Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Although the escalation of the war in Vietnam did not begin until after 1963, Peking had always been sensitive to such a possibility as manifested in its repeated warning that the UN should not meddle in the civil war in Vietnam.

⁷² The most significant events during this period were, perhaps, the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China in July and August of 1960 and the confrontation between Khrushchev and Chou En-lai at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1961. See Floyd, David, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 284–285, 313–320Google Scholar.

⁷³ For the Soviet view on UNEF and UNOGIL see Dallin, Alexander, The Soviet Union at the United Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), Chapter XGoogle Scholar; and Bloomfield, Lincoln P. and others, International Military Forces (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), Chapter 4Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ The Soviet position on the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC) reflects its concern over the division of power between the Security Council and the General Assembly. See Stoessinger, John G., ”Financing Peace-Keeping Operations,” in Stoessinger, John G. and Westin, Alan F. (ed.), Power and Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), pp. 140–178Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ See Chi, Kuo, “What Is the So-called ‘UN Permanent Forces’?,” Shih-chieh Chih-shih (World Culture) (Peking), 0510, 1965 (No. 9), pp. 26–27Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ See American Consulate General (Hong Kong), Survey of China Mainland Press, for this period. One cannot fail to sense Peking's anxiety over this issue.

⁷⁸ Mezerik, p. 76.

⁷⁹ General Assembly Resolution 1998 (XVI), December 14, 1961.

⁸⁰ American Consulate General (Hong Kong), Survey of China Mainland Press, 12 29, 1961 (No. 2648), pp. 34–36Google Scholar.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Peking Review, 12 27, 1963 (Vol. 6, No. 52), pp. 14–16Google Scholar.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 16.

⁸⁴ In September and October 1962 military clashes along the Himalayas between the two Asian states occupied headlines all over the world. Peking showed some restraint afterward, but its neighbor was irrevocably humiliated. The two Asian states have been hostile toward each other ever since. See Selected Documents on Sino-lndian ‘Relations, December 1961–May 1962 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1962)Google Scholar; “More on Nehru's Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-lndian Boundary Question,” Jenmin Jih-Pao (People's Daily)(Peking), 10 27, 1962Google Scholar; and Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet, December 12, 1962, in Floyd, pp. 327–333.

⁸⁶ Steiner, H. Arthur, “Communist China in Overview,” Asian Survey, 01 1963 (Vol. 3, No. 1), pp. 1–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁶ In 1963 representatives of Communist China took part in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Tanganyika on February 7–10; Liu Shao-ch'i toured four Southeast Asian nations in April; the Chinese athletic team trampled a mediocre team from Russia at the first Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO I) in November; and in December Chou En-lai, Chen Yi, and an impressive entourage of more than 50 were on a seven-week visit in ten African countries, spreading the idea of a “third force” consisting of countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

⁸⁷ “The Second Bandung Conference,” China Quarterly (London), 07–09 1964 (No. 19), pp. 194–195Google Scholar.

⁸⁸ Peking Review, 05 29, 1964 (Vol.7, No. 22), pp. 8–9Google Scholar. See also Yi's, Chen letter to Xuan Thuy in Peking Review, 08 14, 1964 (Vol. 7, No. 33), pp. 8–9Google Scholar.

⁸⁹ Peking Review, 10 16, 1964 (Vol. 7, No. 42), pp. 1 ffGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁰ American Consulate General (Hong Kong), Survey of China Mainland Press, 12 9, 1964 (No. 3353), pp. 28–31Google Scholar.

⁹¹ Peking Review, 01 15, 1965 (Vol. 8, No. 3), p. 4Google Scholar.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ ibid., pp. 5–6.

⁹⁴ ibid., pp. 6–9.

⁹⁵ An Indian observer writing in late 1964 correctly detected Communist China's lack of interest in the UN. See Narain, K. V., “Peking's Game at the UN,” Atlas, 11 1964 (Vol. 8, No. 4), pp. 239–240Google Scholar. Professor Werner Levi thought otherwise. See his “China and the United Nations,” Current History, 09 1964 (Vol. 47, No. 277), pp. 149–155, 180Google Scholar.

⁹⁶ It is true that Peking had hinted in the World Peace Council as early as 1950 at the desirability of a “more effective means” than the UN to meet “the world's hopes for peace.” But those words would seem to imply frustration rather than serious contemplation.

⁹⁷ Claude, Inis L. Jr, Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (3rd ed.; New York: Random House, 1964), Chapter 14Google Scholar.

⁹⁸ Peking Review, 01 29, 1965 (Vol. 8, No. 5), pp. 5–6Google Scholar.

⁹⁹ Snow, Edgar, “Interview with Mao,” The New Republic, 02 27, 1965 (Vol. 152, No. 9), pp. 19–20Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁰ ibid., p. 20.

¹⁰¹ ibid., p. 19.

¹⁰² The Economist, 06 26, 1965 (Vol. 215, No. 6357), p. 1492Google Scholar.

¹⁰³ Kuang-ming Jih-pao (Kuang-ming Daily) (Peking), 06 29, 1965, p. 1Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁴ Peking Review, 10 29, 1965 (Vol. 8, No. 44), pp. 5–6Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁵ Peking Review,10 8, 1965 (Vol. 8, No. 41), p. 10Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁶ See Peking Review, 10 22, 1965 (Vol. 8, No. 43), pp. 7Google Scholar, for a Chinese account of the ”September 30 Movement.” For five months Peking tolerated the purge of the PKI and the massacre of overseas Chinese in Indonesia in the hope that Sukarno might regain the upper hand. But Sukarno was forced to give up power on March 11, 1966. Afterward, Chinese attacks on the Indonesian “rightwing” became very sharp.

¹⁰⁷ See Matthews, Herbert L., “Three Continents Plus Cuba,” The New York Times, February 7, 1966, p. 28Google Scholar; and Peking Review, 07 25, 1966 (Vol. 9, No. 9), pp. 13–25Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁸ See Peking Review, 03 11, 1966 (Vol. 9, No. 11), pp. 7—11Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁹ Snow, Edgar, “Interview with Mao,” The New Republic, 02 27, 1965 (Vol. 152, No. 9), pp. 19–23Google Scholar.

¹¹⁰ The Economist, 07 26, 1965 (Vol. 215, No. 6457), pp. 1492–1493Google Scholar.

¹¹¹ The expected monsoon offensive of the Viet Cong failed to materialize and the American bombing intensified.

¹¹² Liu Shao-ch'i paid a visit to Pakistan in late March 1966 and regained some Pakistani ties to Communist China. See Peking Review, 04 1, 1966 (Vol. 9, No. 14), pp. 3–6Google Scholar.

¹¹³ See The New York Times, 04 10, 1966, p. 17Google Scholar; and Peking Review, 04 8, 1966 (Vol. 9, No. 15), p. 16Google Scholar.

¹¹⁴ Matthews, Herbert L., “Three Continents Plus Cuba,” The New York Times, 02 7, 1966, p. 28Google Scholar.

¹¹⁵ UPI Paris dispatch, February 18, 1966. See Dayton Daily News, February 18, 1966, p. 6.

¹¹⁶ The New York Times, March 2, 1966, p. 1; The New York Times, March 8, 1966, p. 5; and The New York, Times, March 10, 1966, p. 1.

¹¹⁷ See Peking Review, 03 25, 1966 (Vol. 9, No. 13), pp. 5–6Google Scholar; and The New York Times, March 24, 1966, p. 14.

¹¹⁸ see peking Review 04 8, 1966 (Vol. 9, No. 15), pp. 19 ffGoogle Scholar.

¹¹⁹ See Peking Review, 11 26, 1965 (Vol. 8, No. 48), pp. 15–18Google Scholar.

¹²⁰ For instance, The New york Times editorial of November 22, 1965.

¹²¹ The full text of this important press conference is in Peking Review, 10 8, 1965 (Vol. 8, No. 41), pp. 7–14Google Scholar.

¹²² ibid.

¹²³ See Peking Review, 11 26, 1965 (Vol.8, No. 48), pp. 15–18Google Scholar.

¹²⁴ Peking Review, 01 1, 1966 (Vol. 9, No. 1), pp. 13–16Google Scholar.

¹²⁵ See The New York Times, December 1, 1966, pp. 1, 12.

¹²⁶ Jen-min Jih-pao, December 2, 1966, p. 1 (translated in Peking Review, 12 9, 1966 [Vol. 9, No. 50], pp. 26–27Google Scholar).

¹²⁷ ibid.

¹²⁸ See Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News)(Taipai), international edition, 07 7, 1966, p. 1Google Scholar, for a report by T'ao Hsi-Sheng on the internal struggle in Peking. See also Yao Wen-yuan, “On ‘Three Family Village,’ “Wen Hui Bao (Shanghai), reprinted in full in Peking Review, 05 27, 1966 (Vol. 9, No. 22), pp. 5–18Google Scholar.