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Un moteur peut-il être sémantique?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Pierre Jacob
Pierre Jacob
Affiliation:
CREA–Paris
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Extract

L'intentionnalité pose aux philosophes qui se réclament du matérialisme ou du physicalisme deux problèmes complémentaires qui sont les deux faces d'une même médaille. Premièrement, peut-on naturaliser l'intentionnalité? Deuxièmement, les propriétés intentionnelles des représentations sont-elles causalement efficaces? Un moteur peut-il être sémantique?

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 32 , Issue 3: Philosophy of Mind , Summer 1993 , pp. 527 - 544
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1993

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